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CASENOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT GUARAN-
TEES ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL THAT IS REASONABLY EF-
FECTIVE AND DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE FAIRNESS OF THE 
PROCEEDING. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
A Florida prisoner pleaded guilty to an indictment that included 
three capital murder charges. l Acting against counsel's advice, the pris-
oner waived his right to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hear-
ing. Defense counsel, in preparation for the hearing, failed to request a 
psychiatric examination or attempt to find any character witnesses. In 
addition, at the hearing counsel did not present any evidence regarding 
the prisoner's character and emotional state.2 The trial judge sentenced 
the prisoner to death on all three murder counts.3 The prisoner subse-
quently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, contending that 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing.4 
The district court denied the petition, and the prisoner appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,S which held that 
the sixth amendment imposes upon counsel the duty to make a reason-
ably substantial investigation, and that an accused must show that inef-
fective assistance of counsel caused actual and substantial prejudice to 
the accused's defense.6 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for applica-
tion of the above standard.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
1. .Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2057 (1984). 
2. Id. at 2057-58. Counsel admitted to experiencing a sense of hopelessness over the 
case after the prisoner had confessed to the first two murders. Thus, counsel's strat-
egy was largely premised upon the trial judge's reputation for being sympathetic, at 
sentencing hearings, to those who admitted their guilt. Counsel's decision also re-
flected his wish to prevent any further evidence of the prisoner's character and emo-
tional state, as well as past criminal activities, from being introduced at the hearing. 
Id. at 2056-57. 
3. Id. at 2058. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Washington 
v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 665-67 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). The 
prisoner sought collateral relief in state court, contending that counsel had rendered 
ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. The trial court denied relief and 
held that the prisoner did not demonstrate that counsel's assistance was so deficient 
as to affect the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2058-59 (1984). The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Washington 
v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). 
4. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2060 (1984). 
5. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 
Unit B 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to apply the standard.> for ineffec-
tive assistance claims as developed in its opinion. The decision of the circuit court, 
however, was vacated when Unit B of the Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en 
banco 679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). The former Fifth Circuit Unit B became 
the current Eleventh Circuit, of which Florida is now a part. 
6. 693 F.2d 1243, 1257-58 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984). 
7.Id. 
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reversed the Fifth Circuit, thus denying the prisoner's petition for writ of 
habeus corpus.8 The Court held that in order to support a claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, an accused must show that counsel's per-
formance was less than reasonable under the circumstances, and further, 
that counsel's deficient representation sufficiently prejudiced the defense 
so as to deprive the accused of a fair trial. 9 
The sixth amendment to the Constitution,1O made applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment, II guarantees an accused the 
right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions.12 The right to counsel 
clause of the sixth amendment was originally perceived to entitle a crimi-
nal defendant only to the right to retain counsel without any interference 
from the government.D The 1932 Supreme Court decision of Powell v. 
Alabama l4 marked the first indication that the constitutional right to 
counsel should be broadly interpreted. The Powell Court construed the 
sixth amendment guarantee in a capital case to include not only the right 
of the defendant to be assisted by counsel, but also the right to have 
counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent. ls Since Powell, the Court 
has progressively broadened the scope of the sixth amendment's right to 
counsel to include the appointment of an attorney to an indigent federal 
felony defendant,16 an indigent state felony defendant,17 and most re-
cently, to any indigent defendant who might be imprisoned. 18 Further-
more, the Court has recognized that the mere appointment of counsel 
does not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of assistance of counsel. I9 
The Court has held that the sixth amendment entitles a criminal defend-
8. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
9. [d. at 2064-69. 
10. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. 
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
12. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
13. Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 29 (1898). 
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
15. [d. at 71. The Powell Court determined that an indigent defendant in a capital case 
not only has the right to appointment of counsel, but that counsel must have suffi-
cient opportunity to confer with defendant and to prepare a defense. [d. For a 
detailed discussion of the expansion of the sixth amendment's right to counsel, see 
W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-76 (1972). 
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462-63 (1938) (sixth amendment requires appoint-
ment of counsel for any indigent federal defendant threatened with loss of life or 
liberty). 
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (defendant's trial and conviction, 
without the assistance of counsel, violates his fundamental right to a fair trial). 
18. Scott v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (actual imprisonment is different from 
fines or threat of imprisonment and thus justifies the right to appointment of coun-
sel); accord, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-37 (1972) (sixth and fourteenth 
amendments guarantee the appointment of counsel to a defendant, whether accused 
of a felony or misdemeanor, who is actually imprisoned). 
19. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (denial of opportunity for ap-
pointed counsel to confer with defendant and prepare a defense turns the constitu-
tional guarantee into a "sham"). 
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ant to the timely appointment of counsel,2o as well as appointment of 
counsel whose representation is not burdened with conflicting interests21 
or state interference. 22 Although the Court had provided defendants 
with the right to effective appointment of counsel,23 it had not yet dis-
cussed whether the sixth amendment required the appointed counsel to 
be competent or to provide the defendant with effective assistance. 
In 1970, the Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged that 
defendants have a constitutional right to competent counseJ.24 In Mc-
Mann v. Richardson,25 the Court stated, in dictum: "the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."26 Although the Mc-
Mann Court equated effective assistance of counsel with the effective 
assistance of competent counsel,27 the Court left the standard for mea-
suring effective, competent assistance to the discretion of the trial 
courtS.28 Thus, the Supreme Court did not establish any uniform stan-
dard for effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. 
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, federal and state courts 
created a variety of diverse standards for measuring effective attorney 
assistance in criminal cases.29 Most state courts have adhered to a test 
requiring proof that counsel's incompetence deprived the defendant of a 
fair tria1.30 A few state courts guarantee the right to a fair trial by exam-
20. Id.; cf Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-54 (1970) (no showing of substantial 
prejudice to defendant even when counsel did not confer with defendant until a few 
minutes before the trial began). 
21. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,69-76 (1942) (where counsel represented a co-
defendant over the objection of defendant, such representation amounted to denial 
of the right to counsel under the sixth amendment); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (ineffective assistance where defendant can show an actual 
conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance); Holloway v. Ar-
kansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-84 (1978) (ineffective assistance where trial judge failed to 
appoint separate counsel to co-defendants with conflicting interests). 
22. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (preventing petitioner from 
consulting with counsel during a 17-hour recess "impinged" upon sixth amendment 
right to counsel); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858, 865 (1975) (ineffective 
assistance when state statute barred final summation by defense counsel). 
23. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
24. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
25. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
26. Id. at 771 n.14. McMann required that counsel's performance be competent in or-
der to be effective. Id. 
27. Id. at 771. Reasonably competent advice is based on "whether that advice was 
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id.; see 
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,344 (1980) (ineffective assistance found where 
counsel provides inadequate advice). This situation, which encompasses the stan-
dards of attorney performance that establish effective assistance of counsel, is the 
focus of this casenote. 
28. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. 
29. See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) ("the Federal Courts of Appeals are in disarray" regarding the 
standard of ineffective assistance); Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 29, 30 (1983). See generally infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 521 P.2d 978, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 
338 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
ining whether counsel's mistakes had a reasonable probability of affecting 
the outcome of the trial,31 Until recently, the federal courts followed the 
"farce and mockery" test, which focused on whether counsel's proce-
dural mistakes denied the defendant a fair trial.32 The "farce and mock-
ery" test was based on the fifth amendment's due process clause and 
required proof that counsel's errors deprived the defendant of a fair 
trial. 33 All of the federal courts of appeals have now rejected the "farce 
and mockery" standard. 34 The courts rejected this standard because of 
disillusionment with the harsh results produced by the standard's heavy 
burden on the defendant. This burden required proof that counsel's rep-
(1974) (assistance of counsel that is neither a "farce" nor a "sham" is adequate 
assistance); State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St. 2d 71, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976) (in determin-
ing whether accused had effective counsel, test is whether defendant received a fair 
trial); Zimmer v. Langlois, 95 R.I. 446, 188 A.2d 89 (prisoner not denied constitu-
tional right to effective representation where he received a fair trial), cert. denied, 
374 U.S. 851 (1963); State v. Myers, 86 Wash. 2d 419,545 P.2d 538 (1976) (test for 
effective assistance of counsel is whether accused was afforded a fair and impartial 
trial). For a discussion of states that apply this fair trial standard, see Annot., 2 
A.L.R.4TH 27, 107-08 (1980). 
31. See, e.g., People v. Dudley, 46 Ill. 2d 305,308,263 N.E.2d 1,3 (1970) (to establish 
incompetent representation defendant must show actual prejudice resulting in an 
adverse verdict), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910 (1971); Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 
604, 502 P.2d 733, 739 (1972) (burden on accused to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation was wholly inadequate, the effect of which was a complete absence of 
counsel); Schoonover v. State, 2 Kan. App. 2d 481,493, 582 P.2d 292, 298 (1972) 
(where counsel's incompetence or dishonesty causes defendant's conviction, defend-
ant is deprived of effective counsel). To establish ineffective assistance under this 
test, the defendant must show actual incompetence of the attorney and that substan-
tial prejUdice resulted. See Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth 
Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380, 1409 (1983) 
(labeling this approach as the "fair trial guarantee"). 
32. See, e.g., William v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965) (relief from conviction 
on ground of ineffective assistance granted only when attorney has inadequate op-
portunity to prepare for trial); Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1965) 
(one is deprived of effective assistance in extreme instances where representation is 
wholly inadequate); United States ex rei. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th 
Cir. 1948) (ineffective assistance where attorney's mistakes amount to a travesty of 
justice); Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1944) (representation by 
counsel which is poor and incapable, but does not amount to a nullity, is constitu-
tionally adequate representation), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 874 (1945). See also Com-
ment, supra note 31, at 1408 (test labeled the "outcome-determinitive" approach). 
33. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). 
In this test, the defendant must show that the trial was "a farce and a mockery of 
justice," as well as showing that counsel's representation was ineffective. If coun-
sel's procedural mistakes denied the defendant a fair trial, a new trial is granted. Id. 
at 669-70. 
34. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977) (rejecting "farce 
and mockery" standard), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Herring v. Estelle, 491 
F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974) ("farce and mockery" standard does not ensure that 
defendant receives effective assistance of counsel); United States ex rei. Green v. 
Rundel, 434 F.2d 1112, 1113 (3d Cir. 1970) (court substitutes "competency" test 
that determines whether assistance of counsel is "reasonably competent" for "farce 
and mockery" standard); see also Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 
U. ON. L. REV. 1, 28 (1973) (" 'mockery' test ... is itself a mockery of the Sixth 
Amendment"). 
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resentation had been wholly ineffective.3s Furthermore, the federal 
courts preferred a sixth amendment analysis that focuses on counsel's 
effective performance rather than the "farce and mockery" test, which 
did not focus on counsel's assistance to the defendant, but on whether the 
defendant had received a fair trial. 36 The abandonment of the "farce and 
mockery" test plus the McMann court's recognition of defendants' right 
to competent counseP7 thus led the federal courts to adopt diversified 
forms of a "reasonable competence" test. 38 
The majority of federal courts apply a standard for effective assist-
ance of counsel under the sixth amendment that requires a showing of 
prejudice resulting from counsel's incompetence.39 Although the courts 
vary in their applications of this approach,4O they generally implement a 
35. See United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970). In Katz, counsel fell 
asleep during the trial. The court, strangely enough, held this to be an error that did 
not constitute a "farce and mockery" of justice. Id. The heavy burden of the stan-
dard is considered unjustified because counsel's role is to protect the defendant's 
rights at trial. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (Supreme Court 
recognizes counsel's important role of protecting defendant's right to fair trial). 
Thus, the defendant's burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel should be 
comparable to the burden required to prove other transgressions at trial. See Note, 
supra note 29, at 35 (discussing harshness of the "farce and mockery" standard); 
Comment, supra note 31, at 1409 (courts have "moved away from the harshness of 
the 'farce and mockery' test"). 
36. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (standard rejected as 
"outmoded"); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir. 1974) (Sixth 
Circuit recognizes the subjective nature of fifth amendment analysis compared to 
objective nature of sixth amendment analysis). For a general discussion of the rejec-
tion of the "farce and mockery" standard, see Note, supra note 29, at 33-36. 
37. 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (discussing "effective assistance of competent counsel"); 
see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
38. E.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("reasonably 
competent assistance" standard is proper test for assessing competence of counsel); 
United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) (adopting "reasonably 
competent assistance" standard); United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 510 
F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.) (test for attorney competence is whether it meets "mini-
mum standard of professional representation"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); 
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (adopting standard of 
"reasonably effective assistance"); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d 
Cir. 1970) (en banc) (effective assistance is provided when counsel performs with 
"normal competency"). 
39. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896-900 & nn.II-20 (5th Cir.), vacated, 
693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) (sur-
veying law in federal circuits); see also Decoster v. United States, 624 F.2d 196,208 
& n.74 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (accused must show that prejudice resulted to prove a 
constitutional violation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 
F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (relief granted only if it appears that 
defendant was prejudiced by counsel's conduct), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); 
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974) (ineffective assistance claim 
requires demonstration that failure of attorney properly to investigate murder case 
prejudiced the defense); United States ex rei. Green v. Rundel, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 
(3d Cir. 1970) (counsel's failure to call alibi witness must prejUdice the defendant's 
case to prove ineffective representation claim). For a survey of the law in state 
courts see Annot., supra note 30, at 109-41. 
40. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 896 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1243 
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two-step inquiry. First, the defendant must demonstrate, under a reason-
ableness standard, that counsel was incompetent.41 The federal courts 
have developed several approaches to this reasonableness standard, in-
cluding the "ordinary fallible lawyer,"42 the "reasonably competent and 
effective" test,43 and the "customary skills and diligence" standard.44 
Second, the defendant must show that counsel's incompetence actually 
prejudiced the defendant's case.45 A minority of federal courts has 
adopted an approach that does not require a showing of prejudice in an 
ineffective counsel claim.46 This minority holds that the sixth amend-
ment guarantees a right to competent counsel, and that a showing of 
incompetence alone will be sufficient to warrant a new tria1.47 The mi-
nority approach requires an examination of whether counsel has compe-
tently performed certain duties enumerated by the courts, including the 
duty to investigate the case, to interview witnesses, to confer with the 
defendant, to conduct pretrial discovery, and to conduct a vigorous de-
fense. 48 Without a consensus on the standard to be applied in an effective 
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) ("no substantial 
consensus among the circuits"); Comment, supra note 31, at 1387 (discussing 
courts' variations in the degree of prejudice required to support ineffective counsel 
claims). 
41. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
42. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
43. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
44. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). 
45. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) 
(applying the two-pronged test), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); McQueen V. 
Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218-20 (8th Cir. 1974) (same); United States ex reI. Green 
v. Rundel, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970) (same). For a description and de-
tailed analysis of this approach, see Comment, supra note 31, at 1386-99 (this ap-
proach labeled the "prejudicial incompetence" approach); Note, Identifying and 
Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After 
United States V. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 757 (1980) (discussing the two-
step inquiry). 
46. See, e.g., United States V. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863,865 n.l (6th Cir.) (court must find 
that counsel's performance is constitutionally ineffective by evaluating soundness of 
counsel's legal judgment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); Beasley V. United 
States, 491 F.2d 687,696 (6th Cir. 1974) (reversal upon finding that counsel is inef-
fective); Coles V. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.) (failure of counsel properly to 
investigate the case and to interview defendant and witnesses constitutes denial of 
effective representation), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). 
47. See United States V. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting); Coles V. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 849 (1968). 
48. United States V. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276 & n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting); see also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.) (effec-
tive counsel constitutes prompt appointment, reasonable opportunity to prepare de-
fense, regular communication with defendant, and appropriate investigation), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); 1 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION STANDING COMMIT-
TEE ON ASSOCIATION STANDARDS, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Chap. 4 
(2d ed. 1980) (defining counsel's duties in criminal cases) [hereinafter cited as ABA 
STANDARDS)' For a discussion and analysis of the minority view, see Comment, 
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assistance of counsel claim, the federal and state courts were in need of 
clarification on the issue when Strickland v. Washington 49 came before 
the Supreme Court. 
In Strickland v. Washington,50 the Supreme Court for the first time 
discussed the appropriate standards to be followed in determining what 
constitutes effective, competent assistance of counsel. The Court held 
that in an ineffective counsel claim the appropriate standard to be ap-
plied, to reverse a conviction or a death sentence, consists of a two-step 
inquiry.51 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness";52 that is, counsel's 
deficiencies offend the sixth amendment's right to reasonably effective 
assistance. 53 Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient 
assistance prejudiced the defense to the point that the defendant was de-
prived of a fair triaP4 
Noting that the protection of the right to a fair tria!55 is the founda-
tion on which the right to counsel was created, 56 the Court held that 
effective assistance of counsel is necessary to preserve the reliability of 
the adversarial nature of a trial. 57 Although the Court declined to imple-
ment specific guidelines for determining the effectiveness of counsel for 
fear of interfering with counsel's independence, it did determine that rea-
sonably effective assistance impels that defense counsel owes certain fun-
damental duties to the defendant. 58 Thus, counsel's representation of a 
supra note 31, at 1399-1408 (labeling the minority view "The Abstract Competence 
Approach"). 
49. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
50.Id. 
5l. /d. at 2064. 
52. Id. at 2065 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 771 (1970) ("reason-
ably competent advice" and "advice. . . within the range of competence demanded 
of attorneys in criminal cases")). 
53. 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Reasonable attorney performance is prescribed by "prevailing 
professional norms." Although the sixth amendment's right to counsel includes 
certain basic duties on the part of the attorney, the Court declined to "form a check-
list for judicial evaluation of attorney performance." Id. 
54. Id. at 2064. 
55. While the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee a 
right to a fair trial, the sixth amendment defines the elements of a fair trial. Id. at 
2063. 
56. Id. at 2063-64. The Court first established that a fair trial requires an "adversarial 
testing" before an "impartial tribunal," and the right to counsel plays an essential 
role in defending the accused. The sixth amendment recognizes that counsel's role is 
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial; right to counsel includes the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970). 
57. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The Court equated a capi-
tal sentencing proceeding to the adversarial proceedings of a trial. Id. (citing Bar-
clay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (paralleling a trial and capital sentencing 
hearing)). 
58. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984). The Court stated that spe-
cific rules would also inhibit both counsel's strategic decisions and his advocacy of 
the client's cause. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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criminal defendant necessitates an obligation of loyalty free of conflicts of 
interest,59 timely communication with the defendant, and a certain de-
gree of adeptness in counsel's use of his skill and knowledge.60 In addi-
tion to not requiring formal guidelines, the Court refused to enforce a 
strict scrutiny standard of counsel's performance in post-trial ineffective 
assistance inquiries. The Court reasoned that too critical an examination 
of counsel's assistance would erode counsel's independence, deter coun-
sel's acceptance of cases, and negatively affect the attorney-client 
relationship.61 
In formulating the second prong of the ineffective assistance test, 
requiring a showing of prejudice, the Strickland Court recognized that 
the sixth amendment's right to counsel ensures confidence in the out-
come of the proceeding by guaranteeing that the defendant is able to 
confront the prosecution's case with competent counsel. 62 The Court 
therefore concluded that a prejudice requirement, which would necessi-
tate proof of the harmful effect of counsel's errors on the verdict, was 
warranted. Such a showing of prejudice was warranted because it dem-
onstrates that, but for' counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different, thus showing the verdict reached to be unreliable. 63 
Justice Marshall, in a strong dissent, described the majority's opin-
ion as "unhelpful."64 The dissent characterized the reasonableness stan-
dard as meaningless because it is so flexible that interpretations will vary 
from court to court.65 Justice Marshall believed that the majority's hold-
ing failed to provide a uniform standard for the circuits. Furthermore, 
Justice Marshall argued that specific guidelines for attorney performance 
are preferable to the majority's prejudice requirement because the preju-
dice standard will allow a defendant to be convicted when his counsel is 
not reasonably effective, consequently violating the defendant's due pro-
cess rights.66 Justice Marshall also criticized the prejudice requirement 
59. 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)); see supra note 26 
and accompanying text. 
60. 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 
61. Id. at 2065-66. 
62. Id. at 2067. "The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to en-
sure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome 
of the proceeding." Id. 
63. Id. The Court pointed out that in some cases, prejudice is automatically presumed: 
for example, prejudice is presumed where no counsel is appointed, where the state 
interferes with counsel's performance, see United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 
2046-47 (1984), and where counsel is burdened with a conflict of interest. See Cuy-
ler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980). 
64. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2075 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 2075-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall equates the sixth amend-
ment's right to counsel with the constitutional right to effective counsel. Thus, inef-
fective assistance would deny a defendant his fundamental right to a fair trial. Id. 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall points out that the majority 
fails to adhere to the stricter standards that should be implemented in a capital 
sentence case. Id. at 2079-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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because he believed that a court, when reviewing an ineffectiveness claim, 
will have problems analyzing whether the outcome of the trial would 
have differed had counsel been competent, because of the difficulty in 
collecting evidence of injury to the defendant. 67 
While Strickland provides some clarification of the guidelines for 
jUdging an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court's two-step 
examination creates a potential anomaly. Although the reasonableness 
test68 provides for a desirable case by case inquiry into each ineffective-
ness claim, the Court has failed to provide a uniform standard to the 
federal circuits for determining what is reasonably effective assistance. 
To present meaningful and workable guidelines, the definition of what is 
reasonable will remain dependent upon the articulate and consistent de-
velopment of the "reasonable" definition by the lower courts.69 Although 
the Strickland opinion leaves lower courts with the responsibility to de-
velop their own standards for deciding whether assistance of counsel has 
been reasonably effective, it also, by requiring a showing of prejUdice, 
allows those same lower courts to escape that responsibility. 70 As a re-
sult of the Court's ruling in Strickland, a trial court may analyze an inef-
fective counsel claim in any order in which the claim may be most easily 
disposed,? I and thus courts, by deciding the prejudice issue first, may 
defeat the entire claim without ever reaching the question of whether 
counsel's assistance was reasonably effective.72 
While Strickland did not develop a specific standard for what consti-
67. 104 S. Ct. at 2076-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cites Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) ("inquiry into a claim of harmless error ... 
would require . . . unguided speculation"). 
68. The Court adopted the majority approach of implementing a reasonableness stan-
dard to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. See supra notes 39-
45 and accompanying text. Likewise, Justice Marshall's dissent follows the minor-
ity view. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
69. For a discussion of the anomaly of the reasonableness standard, see Note, supra note 
29, at 36-40 (no incentive to perform more adequately than is necessary under the 
reasonableness test; thus, there is low duty of performance); see also Comment, 
Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sen-
tencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1544, 1572 (1983). The adoption of the reasonableness 
standard may thus be seen as consistent with the Court's analysis in McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (discretion of lower courts in measuring stan-
dard of attorney's cOl;npetence). 
70. The Strickland Court states that the purpose of the ineffectiveness claim is "not to 
grade counsel's performance." The Court therefore allows lower courts to dismiss 
ineffectiveness claims on the prejudice issue without examining whether the attor-
ney's representation was competent. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2070 (1984); see Comment, supra note 69, at 1573 (prejudice requirement introduces 
unpredictability and unreliability into the sentencing process). 
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2069-70. 
72. See United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236, 240 (7th Cir.) (court declines to analyze 
whether attorney was reasonably competent because the ineffectiveness claim fails 
because of lack of prejudice), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). This may result in 
the dispensing with the reasonableness standard's primary function of serving as a 
guide for defining effective assistance. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
344 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
tutes reasonably effective assistance,13 the Fourth Circuit74 and the 
American Bar Association75 have constructed checklists setting out the 
basic duties of defense counsel in a criminal case.76 Generally, a counsel 
who fails properly to investigate the available defenses of his client, who 
fails actively to prepare the defendant's case, or who delays in conferring 
with the defendant will be regarded as ineffective,77 and will thus satisfy 
the first prong of the Strickland test in an ineffective assistance claim. 
The holding in Strickland is result-oriented because the Court is 
preoccupied with preserving convictions rather than with protecting the 
right to a fair trial. In addition to providing for the convenient dispens-
ing of ineffectiveness claims by allowing defeat of the claim by a showing 
of a lack of prejudice to the defendant,78 the Strickland Court expressed 
an interest in ensuring that the criminal justice system is not burdened 
with an excessive number of such claims.79 Legitimate ineffective coun-
sel claims, however, benefit the criminal justice system by ensuring that 
the adversarial nature of the trial is preserved. Another problem with 
the Strickland holding is that the Court grants substantial deference to 
the trial counsel's perlormance by giving the defendant "an unusually 
weighty burden of persuasion."80 The heavy burden of proof on the de-
fendant to establish prejudice will tend to finalize convictions that are 
obtained when the defendant was assisted by incompetent counsel.8! 
Furthermore, the prejUdice requirement applied to a capital sentencing 
hearing seems unusually harsh in light of recent Supreme Court decisions 
holding that the uniqueness of the death penalty requires a greater mea-
sure of certainty that the sentence was properly imposed. 82 
In Strickland, the Court's analysis of ineffective counsel claims is 
self-defeating. While the reasonableness standard may provide guidance 
through case law development, the prejudice requirement may preclude a 
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
74. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). 
75. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 48. 
76. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit, in Coles, 
adopted the specific guidelines for determining when the assistance of counsel is 
ineffective. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). Although Strickland did 
not adopt specific duties that counsel must perform in order to be effective, the 
Court's adoption of "basic duties" of counsel suggests that reasonably effective 
assistance will entail certain required functions. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984). 
78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
79. 104 S. Ct. at 2070. 
80. Id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court, in the majority opinion, refers to a 
"heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments," id. at 2066, and a "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct. . . [is] reasonable" under the circumstances. 
Id. at 2065-66. 
81. See id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
82. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (higher stan-
dard of review in death penalty case); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(special "constraints on administration of capital punishment); see also Comment, 
supra note 65, at 1573 (allocation of the risk of sentencing error in capital cases). 
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court from reaching the first step of analyzing what is reasonable.83 The 
Court should follow the rule established by the Fifth Circuit, which at-
tempts to avoid this anomaly by requiring an examination of the effective 
assistance inquiry before the actual prejudice issue, even though the 
claim will clearly be defeated on the prejudice question. 84 Although the 
Court relies heavily on the preservation of the right to a fair trial as the 
underlying fundamental right requiring it to structure an effective assist-
ance of counsel standard, the Strickland Court seems to have been more 
interested in preserving the finality of the verdict than in preserving the 
defendant's sixth amendment guarantees. The result of Strickland very 
well may be the expeditous disposal, if not the outright discouragement, 
of ineffective assistance allegations, rather than the protection of the fun-
damental fairness of the proceedings in such claims. 
Jonathan E. Fink 
83. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
84. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1258, 1263-64 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) 
(en bane), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
